The 7th Cir found that (a) there was no requirement for someone to be charged on a terrorist ground of removability for the terrorist bars to apply (sub silentio rejecting published Board decisions that require that deportability be alleged and proven before someone is "deportable" on that ground); (b) that although terrorism ground was broad and counter-intuitive, it was not vague; (c) being a part of an organization whose members engaged in violent acts, with no denunciation of those acts by the organization, constitutes terrorist activity. Petition denied.
The 9th Cir issued a Ventura remand, ordering the BIA to determine whether a child between 18 and 21 is a minor for purposes of tolling the one-year filing deadline in an asylum case. They found that although the minor had never argued that issue before the BIA or IJ, that his minority might excuse that failure, so ordered BIA to address that question as well.
Judge Rawlinson dissented, refusing to "bootstrap" jurisdiction onto the question of minority.
A petitioner whose father obtained her LPR status through fraud sought suppression of the evidence on regulatory privacy grounds. The 9th Cir found that she had no protected liberty interest in avoiding detection as an illegal immigrant. While the Court noted that the exposure likely didn't violate the regulations in any event, it chose to rest its decision on a potentially dangerous liberty interests analysis.
Interpreted 9th Cir settlement agreement in Barahona-Gomez v. Ashcroft, 243 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“Barahona- Gomez II”). Court found that the class includes people whose master calendar hearings were scheduled in the period leading up to 4/1/97.
The 9th Cir refused to estop DHS based on sale of LPR card by DHS employee. It also upheld as satisfactory of Due Process the use of one cross-exam (with multiple counsel) of corrupt DHS employee, and denied remand for 2nd mtn to reopen where no proof of I-140 approval, and also number-barred.
The 2d cir joined the 1st and 9th in holding that even if minor would have been charged as a juvenile under federal law, treatment as adult under state law was dispositive. Although it stated that it lacked jurisdiction, it addressed his CAT and withholding claims, and denied the PfR rather than dismissing.
The 7th Cir found that felon-in-possession laws fall within the aggravated felony definition at 101(a)(43)(E)(ii), upholding the Board's decision in Matter of Vasquez-Muniz, 23 I&N Dec. 207 (BIA 2002). Additionally, it held that deference to BIA interpretation of the aggravated felony provisions is appropriate outside the drug context, and it rejected the simultaneous 212(c) and cancellation theory.
The 7th Cir found a final order, for purposes of jurisdiction, where the BIA affirmed the IJ grant of withholding and denial of asylum; but found review of the asylum denial precluded by the jurisdiction-stripping statute. Expressing disagreement with the 9th circuit's decision in Ramadan, Judge Easterbrook reaffirmed the 7th Cir's view that only pure questions of law are reviewable under 1252(a)(2)(D).
Carmenatte-Lopez v. Mukasey, (8th Cir. 03/03/2008)
WOLLMAN, Gibson, Benton
The 8th Cir. found that fears of witness of politically-motivated crime doesn't qualify for asylum, because persecution not on account of imputed political opinion.
The 9th Cir found that false identification to police was not a CIMT, so overturned cancellation denial. However, the CtApp found that substantive evidence supported the finding that undocumented man made false claim to USC at the border, and thus that he was ineligible for AOS.
Immigration Litigation Update 
