The 8th Cir refused to consider most of the Petitioner's arguments, because he didn't file a Petition for Review from the initial BIA decision, only from the denial of reconsideration. Upheld the BIA's reasoning in denying reconsideration.
The 9th Cir held that: (a) the petty offense exception is unavailable for a felony which had a guidelines range of 0-6 months, because it is the statutory maximum, not the guidelines, which govern; (b) no due process violation where EOIR returned 2d atty's motion to substitute and for a continuance, based on the fact that the 1st atty had not withdrawn (because Petitioner had 3 months to file his applications). Petitioner is a LPR of 17 yrs who was eligible for 212(h) as a returning LPR.
The DC Cir addressed the attempts of a then-detained USC who wanted to renounce his citizenship after the US invaded Iraq. The DC Cir remanded to the District Court to determine whether the AG still has authority over renunciations; and commented in dicta on the Govt's attempts to avoid mandamus jurisdiction based on the fact that he didn't file an official form (when DOJ has exercised its discretion not to create a form), and on the argument from national security, casting aspersions on both arguments.
The 7th cir denied a Chinese asylum case, finding that the fact of filing within one year is a factual, not legal determination (though also, ambiguously, finding that the IJ's finding was correct in saying that clear and convincing evidence didn't support the claimed entry date); and that substantial evidence supports credibility denial. In dicta, noted that IJ's analysis of time required for abortion was not supported, and also discussed the forensic analysis.
Maqsood Hamid Mir (apparently not an AILA member) - and his law firm - were convicted of fraud and conspiracy, though acquitted of racketeering and witness tampering. He challenged those convictions for immigration-unrelated reasons, that taped conversations with witnesses were barred by Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The 4th Cir affirmed the convictions.
The 6th Cir held that where a man insulted a Prince in the UAE, and police tried to throw him in jail as a result (and imprisoned his brother for 6 months), it was not on account of political opinion, but just a business dispute.
The 9th Cir found that the rape of a Filipina by the NPA was on account of her imputed political opinion, where the rebels came to the family house to kidnap her, said things that were political, and did the deed on account of her father's perceived pro-govt orientation.
The earlier decision found that statutory rape by a 22 year old of 16- or 17-year old girl was "sexual abuse of a minor" - Judge Thomas concurred, along with a DistCt judge, urging rehearing to alter the rule in Afridi v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2006).
The 9th Cir applied the Ramadan test, reviewing the Board's "application of law to fact" in finding the IJ's reasoning regarding the one-year issue to be flawed. The IJ found that because the applicant had always intended to apply for asylum, that it could not meet the changed circumstances test. The CtApp found that where his asylum case was previously weak, that the breakdown of the peace accords made it objectively tenable; and found the IJ's reasoning to be legal error.
The 9th Cir assumed, arguendo, that someone subject to reinstatement could obtain habeas-equivalent review at the CtApp; but finding no prejudice, the CtApp found no "gross miscarriage of justice" and denied the (converted from habeas) petition for review. Earlier opinion in this case (Paez concurring, arguing for 1252(a)(2)(D) review of reinstatements) withdrawn.
Immigration Litigation Update 
