Where an Afghan army member was found to have a fear of future persecution by the Taliban, the IJ denied asylum on grounds that he should have tried to internally relocate. The 7th Cir reversed, finding no grounds to believe that internal relocation was possible (and if not possible, he should not be punished for not seeking it) - it noted that what was possible in 1992 is not substantial evidence of what is possible today, and that relocation through the army would not be likely to keep him safe. Further, the Court of Appeals found that any relocation, even if it were possible, would not be "reasonable" - particularly in light of the IJ's theory that he might be in danger, but not due to persecution. Also, the fact that relocation through the Army would place his family in greater danger was another reason that relocation was not "reasonable" in this case.
Where an IJ introduced information into evidence which he found on the internet, the 7th found that Petitioner didn't timely object, and that the IJ gave both parties a chance to respond - so no statutory or constitutional violation. Additionally, the IJ's questioning of the Petitioner was no particularly adversarial or harsh, so that the Court found no abuse.
The 7th Cir found no jurisdiction to review one-year claim of individual who entered as minor, but didn't apply for 18 months after she turned 18. Found that IJ's admission into evidence of documents was troubling, but not where judicially noticeable, and he gave notice to parties. No problem with IJ's questioning here, and when he cut off testimony it was a tangent.
Where an individual feared future persecution in Afghanistan by Taliban, BIA and IJ denied because he didn't try to get help from the Army; but that said nothing about whether relocation was possible. CtApp didn't think it was in fact possible (noting in passing that IJ improperly refused to credit his testimony re desertion, though he was found to be credible). Any evidence that he could relocate safely wasn't "substantial," it was vague and hopeful. IJ's finding that internal relocation would be "reasonable" because attacks wouldn't be "persecutive in nature" ignored regulatory requirement that she consider "ongoing civil strife." Also ignored the fact that internal relocation would have placed family in greater danger. Substantial evidence didn't support that relocation was possible or reasonable. Granted.
The 7th Cir rejected the Govt's argument that he didn't administratively exhaust, finding that his claims, while not detailed, were sufficient to put the BIA on notice as to his claims. IJ and BIA failed to consider arguments that he would face future persecution (a) from the Israelis, in the form of economic persecution, and (b) from Palestinians on account of his alleged spying for Israel. Re imputed political opinion the CtApp said: "it makes little difference that Hamdan, as the IJ put it, 'never affirmatively expressed his neutrality'; what does matter is how militant groups perceived Hamdan’s political affiliation—regardless of what he 'affirmatively expressed'—and whether it was likely that they would harm him because of that perception." CtApp found that IJ misperceived the argument, and thus failed to address it.
Seventh Circuit 
