The 7th Cir criticized ICE's repeated refusal to release an individual granted a $15,000 (then $60,000) bond, despite an FBI letter alleging that he might be a security risk - but ultimately upheld the habeas denial because in the meantime he was granted Voluntary Departure under safeguards (i.e., without bond).
The 7th Cir reversed a grant of class certification for a class of U.S. citizens alleging that they had been wrongfully stoped at the US border. The Court criticized an "open-ended" class definition that didn't clearly delineate who was in the class and who wasn't; and further stated (though it may be dicta) that claims of wrongful stoppage at the border are best handled by individual suits for damages.
The 7th Cir refused to address the "question of law" arguments made in response to a one-year denial, because they had not been made to the IJ or BIA - the legal issue must at least be raised below. Accord, Ramani v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 554, 559 (6th Cir. 2004); Theodoropoulos v. INS, 358 F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 2004); Marrero v. INS, 990 F.2d 772, 779 (3d Cir. 1993); Alvarez-Flores v. INS, 909 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1990); Farrokhi v. INS, 900 F.2d 697, 700 (4th Cir. 1990); Vargas v. INS, 831 F.2d 906, 907-08 (9th Cir. 1987); Youssefinia v. INS, 784 F.2d 1254, 1258 (5th Cir. 1986).
Re withholding, the CtApp held that common fear of violence is "generally insufficient" to support withholding (noting that not "pattern and practice" claim was advanced), or else entire countries would be asylum-eligible. It found the IJ's refusal to credit her story of a personal threat - which conflicted with her credible fear interview - to be reasonable.
The 7th Cir remanded to the IJ and BIA where they failed to address the withholding claim advanced by a stateless Palestinian. He feared persecution by Palestinians who took his neutrality between Israel and the Palestinians as evidence that he was a spy - the IJ said that he never affirmatively expressed his neutrality. But the claim was that he would be impute to have a particular opinion - as such, it didn't matter whether he affirmatively expressed that neutrality.
Where an Afghan army member was found to have a fear of future persecution by the Taliban, the IJ denied asylum on grounds that he should have tried to internally relocate. The 7th Cir reversed, finding no grounds to believe that internal relocation was possible (and if not possible, he should not be punished for not seeking it) - it noted that what was possible in 1992 is not substantial evidence of what is possible today, and that relocation through the army would not be likely to keep him safe. Further, the Court of Appeals found that any relocation, even if it were possible, would not be "reasonable" - particularly in light of the IJ's theory that he might be in danger, but not due to persecution. Also, the fact that relocation through the Army would place his family in greater danger was another reason that relocation was not "reasonable" in this case.
Seventh Circuit 
