Heartland Alliance's National Immigrant Justice Center's experienced legal staff can speak about the legal ramifications of immigration laws, provide analysis of how immigration policies play out in immigrant communities, and help put reporters in touch with immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers who can provide a human face to stories about the U.S. immigration system.
Heartland Alliance's National Immigrant Justice Center congratulates President-Elect Barack Obama and Vice President-Elect Joseph Biden on their historic victory. The National Immigrant Justice Center welcomes the election of two leaders who have championed broad reform of our broken immigration system, protection for victims of human trafficking, and safety for immigrant victims of domestic violence.
Heartland Alliance's National Immigrant Justice Center congratulates President-Elect Barack Obama and Vice President-Elect Joseph Biden on their historic victory. The National Immigrant Justice Center welcomes the election of two leaders who have championed broad reform of our broken immigration system, protection for victims of human trafficking, and safety for immigrant victims of domestic violence.
The Court found that misdemeanor assault under R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-5-3 was a crime of violence, and thus, an aggravated felony. In analyzing the RI statute under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), the Court found that in relying on past case law defining RI assault, “there can be no assault without the presence of physical force”. Lopes v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2007). The Court rejected Campos-Gomez’s argument that the RI assault statute could be met with a mens rea of reckless which would be insufficient for the “use of force” requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 16 as the Court had already held that for assault there had to be “an intent to commit an assault, or there could be no assault at all.” State v. Baker, 38 A. 653 (R.I. 1897).
The 2nd Circuit dismissed this appeal from the CT district court, finding that a plaintiff who had filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment and mandamus to compel CIS to grant AOS could not claim fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act where CIS had voluntarily granted AOS without judicial sanction. EAJA fees may be awarded only to a "prevailing party," and the 2nd Circuit held that the definition of "prevailing party" set forth by the Supreme Court in the context of the Americans with Disabilities Act (see Buchanan, 532 U.S. 598 (2001)) also applies to EAJA. This definition requires that the change made be judicially sanctioned. As CIS voluntarily granted AOS following filing of the suit, and the suit was then dismissed as moot, plaintiff was not eligible for EAJA fees.
Atty for petitioner: Jason A. Nielson, Law Offices of Joe Zhenghong Zhou & Associates PLLC, Flushing, New York.